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Abstract
The paper examines the timing of endogenous wage setting under Bertrand competition in
a unionized mixed duopoly. The results are that when the public firm chooses the timing of
wage setting: (1) sequential wage setting is the outcome and (2) simultaneous wage setting
is the outcome. The first result coincides with the choices of the private firm, its union, and
the union of the public firm if imperfect substitutability is sufficiently large. This result is in
contrast to the findings of prior literature. However, but the second result does not coincide
between firms and their unions if imperfect substitutability is sufficiently small. However,
simultaneous wage setting is more likely to improve the welfare if imperfect substitutability
is sufficiently small. Furthermore, we find that the impact of sequential wage setting on the
equilibrium path is lower in terms of improving welfare than the other outcome of sequential
wage setting.
JEL: D21, J51, H44, L13.
Keywords: Endogenous Wage Setting, Bertrand Competition, Mixed Duopoly, Social Wel-
fare.
1 Introduction
There are several studies of pure oligopolies where private firms maximize their own profit
by adopting the timing of endogenous wage-setting between firms and unions. Theoretical
studies that introduce the timing of endogenous wage-setting (i.e., the setting of input costs) into
oligopolistic markets include De Fraja (1993a), Corneo (1995), and Barcena-Ruiz and Casado-
Izaga (2008) under either Cournot or Bertrand competition. They showed that if private firms
decide the timing of wage setting, in equilibrium they will decide to play simultaneously. But if
unions choose the timing, in equilibrium, the unions will decide to play sequentially. Specifically,
Barcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2008) extend the findings of Brekke and Straume (2004)1
by introducing the timing of endogenous wage-setting. Thus, they showed that both unions
prefer sequential wage-setting and that the timing of wage setting does not alter the location
equilibrium. In addition, Barcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2008) demonstrate that bargaining
over wages is simultaneous if and only if two private firms decide the timing of wage negotiation;
otherwise, negotiation takes place sequentially, which is similar to the results derived by De Fraja
(1993a) and Corneo (1995). However, none of these papers have considered the case in which
both private and public firms choose to bargain over wages in endogenous timing under Bertrand
Competition in a unionized mixed duopoly. Hence, we investigate Bertrand competition in a
unionized mixed duopoly where wages can be negotiated either simultaneously or sequentially.
That is, we extend Barcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2008) for evaluating Bertrand competition
†Graduate School of International Studies, Pusan National University Jangjeon-dong, Geumjeong-gu, Busan
609-735, Republic of Korea. Tel:+82-51-510-2532. Fax:+82-51-581-7144. E-mail: choipnu@pusan.ac.kr
1In a spatial context, Brekke and Straume (2004) have analyzed how equilibrium locations in location-price
games under Hotelling’s model are affected when wage negotiations occur simultaneously.
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by considering the timing of endogenous wage-setting where outputs are chosen simultaneously
in a mixed-duopoly context.
There have been some attempts, namely, De Fraja (1993b), Haskel and Sanchis (1995), Haskel
and Szymanski (1993), and Ishida and Mastushima (2009), to introduce the union’s utility into
a model of mixed-duopoly markets2. In particular, De Fraja (1993b) and Haskel and Sanchis
(1995) investigate the wage-bargaining process in mixed duopolies for examining the effect of
privatization. Furthermore, focusing on wage regulation, Ishida and Mastushima (2009) analyze
the optimal framework that is imposed on the public firm and the union. However, few studies
have been undertaken on how the effect of the timing of endogenous wage negotiations between
the public and private firms influences product-market interactions. Moreover, while many of the
previous analyses that have been conducted on union’s utility focused on the power of collective
bargaining, any discussion of the issue under Bertrand competition in mixed oligopolies ignores
the timing of endogenous wage setting.
In fact, we bring together two independent strands of the literature: a mixed-duopoly market
under Bertrand competition and wage setting. We consider that differentiated outputs in a
mixed duopoly are chosen simultaneously but extend previous works by assuming that the
timing of wage setting is endogenously determined under Bertrand competition. Consequently,
the present study differs from the existing literature in at least two important ways. First, the
existing studies on mixed oligopolies consider simultaneous wage-setting rather than the effects
of different timings of wage setting. Second, prior studies on unionized mixed oligopolies mainly
focus on Cournot competition, while our study investigates Bertrand competition in a mixed
duopoly and social welfare depending on the nature of goods (i.e., imperfect substitutability)
and the timing of wage setting. This is why our analysis needs to be extended to the case of
Bertrand competition in a unionized mixed duopoly.
Firstly, our findings show that bargaining over wages under Bertrand competition in a union-
ized mixed duopoly is always sequential if the degree of imperfect substitutability is sufficiently
large. Otherwise, the standard results follow if the degree of imperfect substitutability is suffi-
ciently small, as De Fraja (1993a), Corneo (1995), and Barcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2008)
point out3. Given that there is a strictly dominant strategy for the private firm, which is to
bargain at the second opportunity, and that all unions prefer to play sequentially rather than
simultaneously, the social welfare is determined on the basis of the degree of imperfect substi-
tutability. That is, if the degree of imperfect substitutability is sufficiently large, the public
and private firms in the sequential case get either greater profits or greater social welfare than
those in the simultaneous case, whereas it is desirable in terms of improving the welfare to force
all the firms to choose the simultaneous case if the degree of imperfect substitutability is suffi-
ciently small. Therefore, on the one hand, the public firm in the case of sequential wage setting
understands that increasing both the output and wage is desirable to maximize the social wel-
fare. On the other hand, the public firm in the case of simultaneous wage setting also considers
price decreases for the consumer surplus. Hence, if the degree of imperfect substitutability is
2In the literature on unionized oligopolies, the bargaining process between the firm and the union has been
developed almost independently. For instance, there is a well-known framework for international unionized
oligopolies regarding the issue of foreign direct investment, as identified by Naylor (1998, 1999), Lommerud
et al. (2003), and Mukherjee and Suetrong (2007). In other related studies, among domestic private firms, the
relationship between the production quantity and the union has been developed (Naylor, 2002; Naylor and San-
toni, 2003). There are many studies considering unionized (international) oligopoly, See for instance, Straume
(2003), Ishida and Matsushima (2008) and references therein.
3While the present work needs to look for potential application areas and study the implication of such union
preferences (i.e. order of wage setting) in these contexts, it is left to future research to develop the analysis more
generally. To the best of the author’s knowledge, only one theoretical study is as follows: Barcena-Ruiz and
Campo (2009) showed that unions may choose to set wages simultaneous spending most on R&D if the size of
the market is small enough and the efficiency of the R&D technology is great enough.
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sufficiently small, the public firm appropriately controls its wages and prices as the latter effect
dominates the former, and vice versa.
Second, in contrast to the findings of the prior literature, we find that simultaneous wage
setting is more likely to improve welfare if imperfect substitutability is sufficiently small. Fur-
thermore, we show that the outcome of sequential wage setting on the equilibrium path is lower
in terms of improving welfare than the other outcome of sequential wage setting. This is because
each level of social welfare is determined by a representative consumer’s utility, which directly
depends upon the degree of substitutability under Bertrand competition in a unionized-mixed
duopolistic market.
Consequently, when the choice of timing of endogenous wage setting is set in a unionized
duopoly, our results differ from the standard findings of De Fraja (1993a), Corneo (1995), and
Barcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2008). They show that regardless of the impact of imperfect
substitutability in a pure duopoly, when wage bargaining is decentralized at the level of the
private firm, unions prefer to play sequentially and vice versa.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model. Section 3
presents fixed-timing games regarding the wage setting. Section 4 determines firms’ endogenous
choices of wage setting and social welfare. Concluding remarks appear in Section 5.
2 The Model
Consider a unionized mixed duopoly situation for a differentiated good that is supplied by a
public firm and a private firm i = 0, 1. Firm 1 is the profit-maximizing private firm and firm
0 is the public firm that maximizes the social welfare. On the demand side of the market, we
assume that the representative consumer’s utility is a quadratic function given by
U = xi + xj − 12
(
x2i + 2cxixj + x
2
i
)
, i 6= j; i, j = 0, 1,
where xi denotes the output of firm i (i = 0, 1). The parameter c ∈ (0, 1) is a measure of
the degree of substitutability among goods, while a negative c ∈ (−1, 0) implies that goods are
complements. In the main body of analysis we focus on the imperfect substitutability case of
c ∈ (0, 1)4. Thus, the inverse demand is characterized by
pi = 1− cxj − xi, i 6= j; i, j = 0, 1, (1)
where pi is firm i’s market price and xi denotes the output of firm i (i = 0, 1). Hence, we can
obtain the direct demands as
xi =
1− c+ cpj − pi
1− c2 , i 6= j; i, j = 0, 1, (2)
provided the quantities are positive.
To analyze the union’s wage bargaining, we also assume that the public and private firms
are unionized and that the wages, wi are determined as a consequence of bargaining between
firms and unions. Let w denote the reservation wage. Taking w as given, the union’s optimal
wage-setting strategy, wi, regarding firm i is defined as:
ui = (wi − w)θxi, i = 0, 1, (3)
4However, we do not analyze imperfect complementarity case of c ∈ (−1, 0) since we could have similar results
when goods are complements. The detailed computations of complements are available from author upon request.
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where θ is the weight that the union attaches to the wage level. As suggested by Haucap
and Wey (2004), Leahy and Montagna (2000), and Lommerud et al. (2003)), for simplicity
of exposition, we assume that the union possesses full bargaining power (i.e., θ = 1) for the
wage level and w = 0 to show our results in the simple way5. Hence, to determine the wage
set at each firm, we consider the monopoly union model, which assume that the union sets
the wage while public and private firms unilaterally decide the level of employment (see Booth
(1995) for good introduction). On the other hand, the firms are homogeneous with respect to
productivity. Each firm adopts a constant returns-to-scale technology where one unit of labor
is turned into one unit of the final good. Thus, the utility function of the union at firm is its
wage bill: ui(wi, Li) = wiLi = wixi.
To specify the public firm 0’s objective function SW , and each firm’s profit pii, as
SW = U −
1∑
i=0
pixi +
1∑
i=0
(pii + ui),
pii = (pi − wi)xi, i = 0, 1,
where U−∑1i=0 pixi is the consumer surplus, and each firm pii is the profit of both the public and
private firms, and ui is the union’s utility for both the private and public firm. The objective
function of the public firm is the sum of consumer surplus, profit of all firms and the union’s
utility for all the firms.
Timing of the second-stage game is as follows. In the first stage, it is simultaneously decided
whether to negotiate over wages in either period 1 or period 2. Note that decision of timing of
wage setting could be taken in each case by the firm, by the union or as a result of negotiations
between a firm and its union. If the periods of negotiation happen to be identical, the wage-
setting process is simultaneous; otherwise, the wage-setting process is sequential. In the second
stage, each firm simultaneously chooses its price to maximize its respective objective knowing
each union’s choice of the wage level.
3 Equilibrium Outcomes
Before analyzing the social welfare and the privatization, we first consider all firms’ maximization
problems. In this paper, since we focus on symmetric Nash equilibrium, we assume that all firms
choose the same type of bargaining. Thus, the game is solved by backward induction, i.e., the
solution concept used is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
3.1 Price Competition in a Unionized Mixed Duopoly
In the third stage, by maximization social welfare (respectively, profit) each firm sets its price
as a best response to any price chosen by its private firm (respectively, the public firm). The
public firm’s objective is given by
max
p0
SW =
(1− c) + cp1 − p0
1− c2 +
(1− c) + cp0 − p1
1− c2
− 1
2
{
[(1− c) + cp1 − p0]2 + [(1− c) + cp0 − p1]2 + 2c[(1− c) + cp0 − p1][(1− c) + cp1 − p0]
(1− c2)2
}
s.t.
(p0 − w0)[(1− c) + cp1 − p0]
1− c2 ≥ 0.
5As Naylor (1998, 1999), Haucap and Wey (2004), Leahy and Montagna (2000), and Lommerud et al. (2003)
suggested, this is because wage claims are decided by the elasticity of labor demand rather than the firm’s profit.
See also Oswald and Turnbull (1985).
4
The constraint implies that there is some lower-bound restriction on the public firm’s profit, i.e.,
the public firm faces a budget constraint6. Therefore, since we assume that each firm’s output
is a positive value as in (2), we can rewrite the budget constraint as follows: (p0−w0)x0 ≥ 0⇔
p0 − w0 ≥ 0.
Denoting the multiplier of the budget constraint λB, the first-order conditions are given by
∂L
∂p0
= 0⇔ λB = −(cp1 − p0)
1− c2 , (4)
∂L
∂λB
= p0 − w0 = 0. (5)
On the other hand, the first-order condition for the private firm is given by
∂pi1
∂p1
= 0⇔ p1 = 1− c+ cp0 + w12 . (6)
By using xi and solving the these two equations (5) and (6) problems yields
x0 =
(1− c)(2 + c) + cw1 − (2− c2)w0
2(1− c2) , (7)
x1 =
1− c− w1 + cw0
2(1− c2) . (8)
3.2 Wage Setting in a Unionized Mixed Duopoly
[Simultaneous Wage Setting]: In the second stage of this case, each wage is set to maximize
the its own firm’s union: ui = xiwi. In the analysis that follows, we focus on the union’s
maximization problem. Using (7) and (8), the problems for union i are defined as
max
w0
u0 = w0x0 =
w0[(1− c)(2 + c) + cw1 − (2− c2)w0]
2(1− c2) , (9)
max
wi
u1 = w1x1 =
w1(1− c− w1 + cw0)
2(1− c2) . (10)
The best reply functions for the public firm 0 and the private firm 1 are w0 =
(1−c)(2+c)+cw1
2(2−c2)
and w1 = 1−c+cw02 , respectively. Thus, straightforward computation yields each an equilibrium
wage, denoted as wbi is obtained by maximizing (9) and (10), and substituting w
b
i into (7) and
(8) yields the equilibrium output xbi and price p
b
i . Thus, we have the following result.
Lemma 1: Suppose that under Bertrand competition, each firm’s union is allowed to engage
in decentralized bargaining. Then, the equilibrium wage, output, union’s utility, and price levels
6As described in Ishida and Mastushima (2009), if both unions aim at maximizing wage level simultaneously
and the public firm’s union does not face the budget constraint with a simple Stone-Geary utility function
ui = (wi − w)θxi, the public firm’s union can unlimitedly raise its wage because the optimal price level of the
public firm is independent of the wage.
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are given by
wb0 =
4− c− 3c2
8− 5c2 , w
b
1 =
4− 2c− 3c2 + c3
8− 5c2 ;
xb0 =
8− 2c− 10c2 + c3 + 3c4
2(1− c2)(8− 5c2) , x
b
1 =
4− 2c− 3c2 + c3
2(1− c2)(8− 5c2) ;
ub0 =
32− 16c− 62c2 + 20c3 + 41c4 − 6c5 − 9c6
2(1− c2)(8− 5c2)2 , u
b
1 =
(4− 2c− 3c2 + c3)2
2(1− c2)(8− 5c2)2 ;
pb0 =
4− c− 3c2
8− 5c2 , p
b
1 =
12− 6c− 9c2 + 3c3
2(8− 5c2) .
Substituting Lemma 1 into (4) then we have
λB =
8− 14c+ 9c3 − 3c4
2(8− 5c2)(1− c2) > 0 if c < 0.90,
which shows that the budget constraint is binding. Since the Lagrange multiplier is marginal
social welfare, when c ≥ 0.90, the Lagrange multiplier is negative, which means that relaxing
the constraint makes social welfare even lower.
Finally, noting that SW b = U b and pib1, we can compute the social welfare and private firm’s
profit as SW b and pib1 respectively;
SW b =
304− 144c− 816c2 + 316c3 + 787c4 − 222c5 − 320c6 + 50c7 + 45c8
8(1− c2)2(8− 5c2)2 , (11)
pib1 =
(4− 2c− 3c2 + c3)2
4(1− c2)(8− 5c2)2 . (12)
[Sequential Wage Setting: Public Firm’s Leader]: In this case, we discuss that the public
firm or its union acts as the leader regarding wage setting. Public firm’s union 0 will choose to
maximize its utility taking as given the private firm’s wage w1 set by private firm’s union 1. By
solving the first-order condition for private firm’s union 1, we have already obtained the best
response function to be represent as: w1 = 1−c+cw02 . By using xi, we obtain that
x0 =
4− c− 3c2 − (4− 3c2)w0
4(1− c2) . (13)
Thus, the problem for public firm’s union 0 is defined as
max
w0
u0 = w0x0 =
w0[4− c− 3c2 − (4− 3c2)w0]
4(1− c2) .
By solving the first-order condition for the public firm’s union 0, we have the following result
when the rival firms takes wage as given, superscript l stands for the leader and f for the fol-
lower7:
7The superscripts in which wages are bargained first in the private firm are symmetric.
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Lemma 2: Suppose thatunder Bertrand competition, the public firm or its union acts as a leader
when each firm’s union is allowed to engage in decentralized bargaining. Then, the equilibrium
wage, output, union’s utility, and price levels are given by
wl0 =
4− c− 3c2
2(4− 3c2) , w
f
1 =
8− 4c− 7c2 + 3c3
4(4− 3c2) ,
xl0 =
16− 4c− 24c2 + 3c3 + 9c4
8(1− c2)(4− 3c2) , x
f
1 =
8− 4c− 7c2 + 3c3
8(1− c2)(4− 3c2) ,
ul0 =
(4− c− 3c2)(16− 4c− 24c2 + 3c3 + 9c4)
16(1− c2)(4− 3c2)2 , u
f
1 =
(8− 4c− 7c2 + 3c3)2
32(1− c2)(4− 3c2)2
pl0 =
4− c− 3c2
2(4− 3c2) , p
f
1 =
24− 12c− 21c2 + 9c3
8(4− 3c2) .
This Lemma 2 suggests that the budget constraint is binding. That is, substituting Lemma 2
into (4) then we have
λB =
16− 28c+ 21c3 − 9c4
8(1− c2)(4− 3c2) > 0,
which shows that the public firm sets the price that yields zero profit in equilibrium8.
Using equilibrium values when the public firm acts as a leader regarding wage setting, we
can compute the social welfare, SW l and the private firm’s profit, pif1 under the unionized mixed
duopoly as follows:
SW l =
1216− 576c− 3632c2 + 1464c3 + 4471c4 − 1230c5 − 1824c6 + 342c7 + 297c8
128(1− c2)2(4− 3c2)2 , (14)
pif1 =
(8− 4c− 7c2 + 3c3)2
32(1− c2)(4− 3c2)2 . (15)
[Sequential Wage Setting: Private Firm’s Leader]: Similar to the previous sequential
wage setting of public firm’s leader, we can directly compute each equilibrium value wmi , x
m
i ,
pmi , and u
m
i where m = l, f ; i = 0, 1 when the private firm or its union acts as a leader;
Lemma 3: Suppose that under Bertrand competition, the private firm or its union acts as
a leader when each firm’s union is allowed to engage in decentralized bargaining. Then, the
equilibrium wage, output, union’s utility, and price levels are given by
wf0 =
16− 4c− 22c2 + 3c3 + 7c4
4(2− c2)(4− 3c2) , w
l
1 =
4− 2c− 3c2 + c3
2(4− 3c2) ,
xf0 =
32− 8c− 60c2 + 10c3 + 36c4 − 3c5 − 7c6
8(1− c2)(2− c2)(4− 3c2) , x
l
1 =
16− 8c− 24c2 + 10c3 + 9c4 − 3c5
8(1− c2)(2− c2)(4− 3c2) ,
uf0 =
512− 256c− 1632c2 + 672c3 + 2056c4 − 648c5 − 1282c6 + 272c7 + 397c8 − 42c9 − 49c10
32(1− c2)(2− c2)2(4− 3c2)2 ,
ul1 =
64− 64c− 128c2 + 128c3 + 80c4 − 84c5 − 11c6 + 18c7 − 3c8
16(1− c2)(2− c2)(4− 3c2)2 ,
pf0 =
16− 4c− 22c2 + 3c3 + 7c4
4(2− c2)(4− 3c2) , p
l
1 =
48− 24c− 64c2 + 26c3 + 21c4 − 7c5
8(2− c2)(4− 3c2) .
8It can be easily checked by which the public firm’s profit is zero in equilibrium; pil0 = [p
l
0 − wl0]xl0 = 0× xl0.
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Similar to Lemma 2, Lemma 3 suggests that the budget constraint is binding. That is, substi-
tuting Lemma 3 into (4) then we have
λB =
64− 64c− 64c2 + 76c3 + 2c4 − 21c5 + 7c6
8(1− c2)(2− c2)(4− 3c2) > 0,
which shows that the public firm sets the price that yields zero profit in equilibrium.
Using equilibrium values when the private firm or its union acts as a leader regarding wage
setting, we can compute the social welfare, SW f and the private firm’s profit, pil1 under the
unionized mixed duopoly as follows:
SW f =
4864− 2304c− 19328c2 + 8192c3 + 34424c4 − 11456c5 − 26040c6
128(1− c2)2(2− c2)2(4− 3c2)2
+
7876c7 + 11795c8 − 2662c9 − 2720c10 + 354c11 + 245c12
128(1− c2)2(2− c2)2(4− 3c2)2 ,
pil1 =
(16− 8c− 24c2 + 10c3 + 9c4 − 3c5)2
64(1− c2)(2− c2)2(4− 3c2)2 . (16)
4 Choice of the Timing of Wage Setting and Social Welfare
4.1 Timing of Endogenous Wage-Setting
Having derived the equilibrium for three fixed-timing games in the previous section and using
the same notation for the timings as before, we will find the Nash equilibrium in the first stage
for any given set of utilities of the unions and profits of the firms in a unionized mixed duopoly.
Let “F” and “S” represent first period and second period with regard to timing choice of wage
setting respectively. When agents (the firms or the unions) have chosen “F” or “S”, they will
play a Cournot-type game of the wage setting in the first period; when the public firm’s agent
has chosen “F” while the private firm’s agent has chosen “S”, a public-leader Stackelberg-type
game of the wage setting arises in the second period; when the private firm’s agent has chosen
“F” while the public firm’s agent has chosen “S”, a private-leader Stackelberg-type game of the
wage setting arises in the second period.
From Lemma 1 to Lemma 3, the reduced endogenous-timing game between unions can be
represented by the following payoff Table 1.
Table 1: Timing of Wage Setting between Unions
Union 1
Union 0
F S
F ub0, u
b
1 u
l
0, u
f
1
S uf0 , u
l
1 u
b
0, u
b
1
To find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, we need to compare the utilities of unions.
Straightforward computations show in Table 1 that9
uf0 > u
l
0 > u
b
0 if c ∈ (0, 0.56]; otherwise, ul0 > uf0 > ub0 if c ∈ [0.57, 1),
uf1 > u
l
1 > u
b
1 if c ∈ (0, 0.64]; otherwise, ul1 > uf1 > ub1 if c ∈ [0.65, 1).
9The detailed computations are available from author upon request; The Appendix B will not be included in
the main paper. However, to provide correct calculations we present on Appendix B, which is only available for
the reviewers and editor.
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These inequalities tell us that regardless of the degree of imperfect substitutability, all unions
prefer to play sequentially rather than simultaneously in unionized-mixed duopolies. Thus, mul-
tiple subgame-perfect Nash equilibria can be sustained: {S, F}, {F, S}. Thus, we have the
following proposition.
Proposition 1: Suppose that under Bertrand competition, the decision of the timing of wage
setting is delegated to unions. Then, there can be sustained multiple endogenous orders of moves.
The orders are {S, F }, and {F, S}.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. Although the leader firm hires fewer employees
in the sequential case (i.e., xli < x
b
i < x
f
i ), the wage is higher when each union prefers to play
sequentially (i.e., wbi < w
f
i < w
l
i)
10. Moreover, in the sequential case, the follower union secures
a higher wage and greater employment. Regardless of the degree of substitutability, the utilities
of unions in the sequential case are higher than those in the simultaneous case. This result is
standard in the literature on wage bargaining (see Barcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga, 2008)11.
Similar to the timing of wage setting between unions, using each private firm’s profit and
social welfare, the reduced endogenous-timing game between firms can be represented by the
following payoff Table 2.
Table 2: Timing of Wage Setting between Firms
Private Firm 1
Public Firm 0
F S
F SW b, pib1 SW
l, pif1
S SW f , pil1 SW
b, pib1
Before finding the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the timing of wage setting between the
private and public firms, we obtain the following result by comparing the level of the private
firm’s profit and the social welfare across the various fixed-timing games12:
Proposition 2: Suppose that under Bertrand competition, the decision of the timing of wage
setting is not delegated to the unions. Then, a comparison of the private firm’s profit and the
social welfare across equilibria yields that
pif1 > pi
b
1 > pi
l
1, SW
f > SW l, SW b > SW f > SW l if c ∈ (0, 0.19];
SW f > SW b > SW l if c ∈ [0.2, 0.27]; SW f > SW l > SW b if c ∈ [0.28, 1).
Proposition 2 tells us that the public firm prefers to play simultaneously if c ∈ (0, 0.19], while
the private firm has a dominant strategy for the second opportunity. Moreover, if c ∈ [0.2, 0.27],
then each firm has a strictly dominant strategy for the second opportunity. Finally, the public
firm prefers to play sequentially if c ∈ [0.28, 1), while the private firm has a strictly dominant
strategy for the second opportunity. Thus, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3: Suppose that under Bertrand competition, the decision of the timing of wage
setting is not delegated to the unions. Then, there are two possible timings in endogenous wage
10Comparing each wage and output is here omitted because it can be easily verified by simple calculations.
11As Barcena-Ruiz and Campo (2000) suggested, the leader chooses a higher wages than the follower. This
result is due to the fact that wages are strategic complements.
12All calculations are in the Appendix A.
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setting. If 0 < c ≤ 0.26, the order is the second opportunity, i.e., {S, S}. If 0.27 ≤ c < 1, the
order is public leader-private follower, viz., {F, S}.
The intuition underlying Proposition 3 is as follows. From Proposition 1, we understand that
from the viewpoint of the private firm, the outputs obtained by the leader firm are lower than
those in the simultaneous case which means that pib1 > pi
l
1, while the outputs obtained by the
follower firm in the sequential case are higher than those in the simultaneous case, which means
that pif1 > pi
b
1. This case is the same for the public firm if c ∈ [0.20.27]. Moreover, when
c ∈ (0, 0.19], although the public firm gets lower outputs in the simultaneous case than in
the follower case, it pays lower wages in the former case. This is because the public firm’s
price13 in simultaneous wage-setting is lower than that in the follower case, which means that
SW b > SW f . On the other hand, if c ∈ (0, 0.19], the outputs obtained by the public firm in the
leader case are lower than those in the simultaneous case, while the price reached by the public
firm in the leader case is higher than that in the simultaneous case, which leads to the result,
SW b > SW l.
However, in Proposition 1, we have considered that the workers employed in the public firm
in the follower case are greater than those in the simultaneous case and that the unions get
higher wages in the sequential case if c ∈ [0.28, 1). From the viewpoint of the public firm, given
that the private firm prefer to play at the second opportunity, the public firm in the leader case
pays higher wages, produces less outputs, and realizes less social welfare, which leads to the
results, SW f > SW l. This is because the public firm in the follower case produces more output
and consumer pays a lesser price for the public firm’s goods. On the other hand, although the
public firm’s price in the leader case is higher than that in the simultaneous case and the unions
get higher wages in the sequential case, the public firm wishes to bargain at the first opportunity.
That is, when c ∈ [0.28, 1), the public firm in the leader case understands that decreasing the
output is not desirable for maximizing the social welfare. Hence, it considers a profit increase as
well as the union’s utility in both public and private firms. In other words, when c ∈ [0.28, 1),
the public firm appropriately controls its wages and prices as the latter effect dominates the
former, which means that SW l > SW b.
Hence, given that there is a dominant strategy for the private firm, which is to bargain
at the second opportunity, the social welfare is determined by depending upon the degree of
imperfect substitutability: if the degree of imperfect substitutability is in the range of c ∈
[0.28, 1), firms in the sequential case get either greater profits or greater social welfare than
those in the simultaneous case, while it is desirable in terms of improving welfare to force the
all the firms to choose the simultaneous case if c is sufficiently small.
Given Proposition 1, 2, and 3, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 4: (1) If 0.27 ≤ c < 1, bargaining over wages is sequential, regardless of who
decides the timing of endogenous wage-setting. (2) If either 0 < c ≤ 0.19 or 0.2 < c ≤ 0.26,
bargaining over wages is simultaneous if and only if all the firms decide on the timing of endoge-
nous wage-setting. Otherwise, wage setting takes place sequentially.
Proof: The part of the proof when 0.2 < c ≤ 0.22 is the same as that provided by Barcena-Ruiz
and Casado-Izaga (2008, pp. 155-157) (see also the supplementary proof in Appendix A). Hence,
we examine the first case (0.2 < c ≤ 0.26) and the second case when 0 < c ≤ 0.19.
Case (1) 0.27 ≤ c < 1.
First, consider the case that both unions decide the timing of wage setting. Then, the public
13We can easily calculate that pli > p
f
i > p
b
i .
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and private firms’ unions do not have incentives to play simultaneously, as noted in Proposition
1.
Second, consider that the private and public firms decide the timing of wage setting. As
shown in Proposition 1 and 2, both firms prefer to play sequentially when 0.27 ≤ c < 1, i.e., the
public firm wishes to bargain at either the first or the second opportunity and the private firm
has a dominant strategy for the second opportunity. This case shows that all the firms prefer
to play sequentially even though there is no dominant strategy for the public firm.
Third, consider that the private (respectively, public) firm and the public (respectively,
private) firm’s union decide on the timing of endogenous wage-setting. The public and private
firms’ unions do not have incentives to play simultaneously. Given this, the private (respectively,
public) firm gets a higher profit (respectively, social welfare) ) under the second (respectively,
first) opportunity. Then, we have a sequential game, {F, S}, at the bargaining stage.
Finally, suppose that the game is played by both firms and unions. In this case, the public
firm’s union does not deviate from the first opportunity and the private firm’s union does not
deviate from the second opportunity because both unions prefer to play sequentially. On the
other hand, if one firm prefers simultaneous wage bargaining, then both unions will prefer to
play sequentially. Given this, neither firm deviates from the sequential case because both unions
always prefer to play sequentially. The same result can be obtained if the game is played by one
firm and its union and vice versa.
Case (2) 0 < c ≤ 0.19.
First, consider the case when both unions decide the timing of wage setting. Then, the public
and private firms’ unions do not have incentives to play simultaneously, as noted in Proposition
1.
Second, consider that the private and public firms decide the timing of wage setting. As
shown in Proposition 1 and 2, there is a strictly dominant strategies for the private firm, which
is to bargain at the second opportunity when 0 < c ≤ 0.19. However, the public firm prefers to
play simultaneously since SW b > SW f > SW l in the range of c ∈ (0, 0.19]. This case shows
that the public firm prefers to play simultaneous even though there is no dominant strategy.
Third, consider that the private (respectively, public) firm and the public (respectively, pri-
vate) firm’s union decide on the timing of endogenous wage-setting. The public and private
firms’ unions have incentives to play sequentially. Given this, the private (respectively, pub-
lic) firm gets a higher profit (respectively, social welfare) under the second (respectively, first)
opportunity.
Finally, suppose that the game is played by both firms and unions. In this case, both unions
do not have an incentive to deviate from the sequential case. Given this, the public and private
firms always prefer to play simultaneously. 
Proposition 4 suggests that sequential wage setting is an equilibrium outcome if the degree of
imperfect substitutability is sufficiently large, which is in contrast to the finding of prior literature
– but this result does not hold if the degree of imperfect substitutability is sufficiently small. The
results of Proposition 4 are directly dependent on the degree of imperfect substitutability under
Bertrand competition in a unionized-mixed duopolistic market. That is, Proposition 4 implies
that as long as the degree of imperfect substitutability is sufficiently large, the equilibratory
nature of sequential wage setting does not depend on who establishes the timing of wage setting,
i.e., the two unions, the unions and only one firm, or one union and both firms. In contrast, the
explanation for the case when imperfect substitutability is sufficiently small is largely analogous
to the arguments of Barcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2008), De Fraja (1993a), and Corneo
(1995) in the literature on both spatial and non-spatial competitions.
Given Proposition 4, it is instructive to compare the social welfare in a simultaneous case
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with that in a sequential case. From Proposition 1, 2 and 3, the social welfare when c ∈ (0, 0.27]
is always determined by SW b under Bertrand competition in a unionized-mixed duopoly if and
if only all the firms decide on the timing of endogenous wage-setting. However, if the decision
on wage setting is delegated to unions when c ∈ (0, 0.27], the social welfare is determined by
either SW l or SW f . Thus, in the first stage, the public firm (or government) might make a
decision regarding wage setting because simultaneous wage setting is more desirable in terms of
improving welfare than sequential wage setting when c ∈ (0, 0.19]. On the other hand, if the
degree of imperfect substitutability is sufficiently large, sequential wage bargaining arises as an
equilibrium outcome. Therefore, if the degree of imperfect substitutability is sufficiently large, a
lower level of the social welfare, SW l, can be obtained regardless of whether the timing of wage
setting is established only by the two unions, by the unions and only one firm, or by one union
and all firms. Proposition 4 also suggests that differences in the implementation of leadership
depend on the degree of imperfect substitutability. That is, the outcome of sequential wage
setting on the equilibrium path when 0.27 ≤ c < 1 is lower in terms of improving welfare than
the other outcome of sequential wage setting.
On the other hand, given the union’s utility, the consumer surplus, CS, in the cases of simul-
taneous and sequential wage-setting is represented with the same superscripts as in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5: Each level of the consumer surplus is determined by
CSb > CSf > CSl if c ∈ (0, 0.13];
CSf > CSb > CSl if c ∈ [0.14, 0.29];
CSf > CSl > CSb if c ∈ [0.3, 1); and
CSf > CSl.
Proposition 5 suggests that the explanations for the consumer surplus are largely analogous to
the arguments for the social welfare. Compared to Proposition 3, Proposition 5 gives us the
situation that is the best in terms of consumer surplus if and only if bargaining over wages is
simultaneous and the degree of imperfect substitutability falls into the interval, c ∈ (0, 0.13]. On
the other hand, if the degree of imperfect substitutability is sufficiently large, sequential wage
bargaining arises as an equilibrium outcome: a lower level of the consumer surplus, CSl, can
be obtained than that of CSf , regardless of who decides upon the timing of endogenous wage
setting.
5 Concluding Remarks
Concerning Bertrand competition, this paper has investigated changes in the social welfare
according to the timing of endogenous wage setting in a unionized-mixed duopolistic market.
Unlike extant literature on mixed duopolies that is based on the timing of exogenous wage-
setting, we have found that the choice of the timing of endogenous wage-setting potentially
differs from De Fraja (1993a), Corneo (1995), and Barcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2008), which
focus on private firms.
We have found that bargaining over wages under Bertrand competition in a unionized mixed
duopoly is always sequential if the degree of imperfect substitutability is sufficiently large. Oth-
erwise, the standard results hold if the degree of imperfect substitutability is sufficiently small.
The intuition of this result is as follows: on the one hand, the public firm in the sequential case
understands that increasing both the output and wage are desirable for maximizing the social
welfare. On the other hand, the public firm in the simultaneous case also considers price de-
creases for the consumer surplus. Hence, if the degree of imperfect substitutability is sufficiently
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small, the public firm appropriately controls its outputs, wages, and prices as the effect of low-
ered prices on the consumer surplus dominates the effect of raising both the output and wage,
and vice versa. Moreover, simultaneous wage setting is more likely to improve the welfare if the
degree of imperfect substitutability is sufficiently small, while sequential wage setting (public
firm being the leader) as an equilibrium outcome is inferior in terms of improving welfare than
the other outcome of sequential wage setting (private firm leader) if the degree of imperfect
substitutability is sufficiently large.
Finally, we did not extend our results by considering a model where the public firm competes
with n private firms or both domestic and foreign private firms. Also, in this paper, we have
used the simplifying assumption that each firm decides the optimal price policy by facing its
trade union. However, in the real world, public and private firms endogenously determine their
vertically differentiated product quality. Moreover, it is interesting and useful to compare the
timing of endogenous wage setting under privatization with that under either nationalization or
partial privatization. The extension of our model in these directions remains an agendum for
future research.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2
(i) Comparison of each social welfare under the unionized mixed duopoly
SW f > SW l ⇔ −64c2 − 32c3 − 796c4 + 104c5 − 2772c6 − 1240c7
+ 1160c8 − 292c9 + 64c10 − 10c11 + 52c12 > 0.
SW b > SW l ⇔ 4096c2 − 3584c3 − 48512c4 + 11328c5 + 63584c6 − 13336c7
− 28975c8 + 6942c9 + 6000c10 − 1350c11 − 995c12 > 0 if c ∈ (0, 0.27];
otherwise, SW b < SW l if c ∈ [0.28, 1).
SW b > SW f ⇔ 12288c2 − 16384c3 − 256256c4 + 68864c5 + 337152c6 − 119296c7
− 142648c8 + 109256c9 + 22696c10 − 55492c11 − 1067c12 + 14902c13
− 1680c14 − 1650c15 + 355c16 > 0, if c ∈ (0, 19];
otherwise, SW b < SW l if c ∈ [0.2, 1).
(ii) Comparison of each private firm’s profit under unionized mixed duopoly
pib1 > pi
l
1 ⇔ 4096c2 − 4096c3 + 32512c4 + 13568c5 + 17600c6 − 17856c7 − 10880c8
+ 11664c9 + 2892c10 − 3780c11 − 45c12 + 486− 81c14 > 0,
pib1 < pi
f
1 ⇔− 2048 + 2048c+ 5632c2 − 6144c3 − 5248c4 + 6848c5 + 1552c6 − 3368c7
+ 263c8 + 618c9 − 153c10 < 0.
Proof of Proposition 4
We provide the case of the range of c ∈ [0.2, 0.27] under the unionized mixed duopoly as follows.
First, consider that both unions decide the timing of wage setting. Then the both unions do
not have incentives to play simultaneously. Given the preference of the rival’s union, each union
prefer to play sequentially.
Second, consider that the public firm and the private firm’s union decide on the timing of
endogenous wage setting. Then, the public firm has a strictly dominant strategy for the second
opportunity since SW f > SW b > SW l in the range of c ∈ [0.2, 0.27]. However, the private
firm’s union prefers to play sequentially, which prefers to be a follower or a leader union.
Third, consider that the private and public firms decide the timing of wage setting. As
shown in Proposition 2, the both firms prefer to play simultaneously regardless of c, which is to
bargain in the second opportunity.
Fourth, consider that the private firm and the public firm’s union decide on the timing
of endogenous wage setting. Then, the public firm’s union prefers to play sequentially, which
prefers to be a follower or a leader union. However, the private firm has a strictly dominant
strategy for the second opportunity pif1 > pi
b
1 > pi
l
1 in the range of c ∈ [0.2, 0.27].
Finally, suppose that the game is played by both firms and unions under each market. In
this case, both unions do not have incentives to deviate from the sequential case. Given this,
the public and private firms always prefer to play simultaneously.
Proof of Proposition 5
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Comparison of each consumer surplus under the unionized mixed duopoly.
Using Lemma 1-5, we get the consumer surplus in both simultaneous and sequential cases. These
calculations are as follows:
CSb =
80 + 16c− 224c2 − 44c3 + 225c4 − 10c5 − 726 + 267 + 3c8
2(1− c2)2(8− 5c2)2 ,
CSl =
320 + 64c− 1040c2 − 184c3 + 1785c4 + 174c5 − 672c6 − 54c7 + 135c8
128(1− c2)2(4− 3c2)2 ,
CSf =
1280 + 256c− 5248c2 − 1024c3 + 11992c4 + 1600c5 − 7610c6 − 1220c7 + 3613c8 − 89610 − 6611 + 91c12
128(1− c2)2(2− c2)2(4− 3c2)2 .
Comparing each consumer surplus under the unionized mixed duopoly shows that
CSf > CSl ⇔ −192c2 + 32c3 − 372c4 − 104c5 − 838c6 + 124c7
− 1070c8 − 64c9 + 289c10 + 12c11 + 44c12 > 0.
CSb > CSl ⇔ 4096c2 − 512c3 − 50304c4 − 10816c5 + 74720c6 + 26136c7
− 46209c8 − 20094c9 + 16080c10 + 5094c11 − 2943c12 > 0 if c ∈ (0, 0.29];
otherwise, CSb < CSl if c ∈ [0.3, 1).
CSb > CSf ⇔ 4096c2 − 226048c4 − 50432c5 + 412800c6 + 182784c7
− 451128c8 − 263040c9 + 369402c10 + 124356c11 − 142149c12 + 13078c13
+ 19888c14 + 5394c15 − 1846c16 > 0, if c ∈ (0, 13];
otherwise, CSb < CSl if c ∈ [0.14, 1).
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Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1
For the reviewers and editor, this appendix B will not be included in the main paper. However,
this is only available for the reviewers and editor: proof of Proposition 1. In this case where we
have been abbreviated, we present on separate page.
(a) Comparison of each union’s utility under unionized mixed duopoly
ub0 < u
l
0 ⇔ −64c4 + 32c5 + 140c6 − 48c7 − 105c8 + 18c9 + 27c10 < 0,
ub0 < u
f
0 ⇔ −2048c3 + 1536c4 + 6400c5 − 4834c6 − 7968c7 + 4888c8 + 4936c9 − 2564c10
− 1521c11 + 699c12 + 186c13 − 71c14 < 0,
ul0 < u
f
0 ⇔ −32c3 + 32c4 + 56c5 − 14c6 − 32c7 + 29c8 + 6c9 − 5c10 < 0, if c ∈ (0, 0.56];
otherwise, ul0 > u
f
0 if c ∈ [0.57, 1).
ub1 < u
l
1 ⇔ −64c4 + 64c5 − 5632c6 − 128c7 − 170c8 − 1212c9 + 11c10 − 18c11 + 3c12 < 0,
ub1 < u
f
1 ⇔ −512c3 + 384c4 + 1088c5 − 720c6 − 776c7 + 431c8 + 186c9 − 81c10 > 0,
ul1 < u
f
1 ⇔ −16c3 + 14c4 + 28c5 − 15c6 − 6c7 + 3c8 < 0, if c ∈ (0, 0.64]; otherwise, ul1 > uf1 if c ∈ [0.65, 1).
(b) Comparison of each wage and output under unionized mixed duopoly
wb1 < w
f
1 ⇔ −4 + c+ 3c2 < 0, wb1 < wl1 ⇔ 0 < c2, wl1 > wf1 ⇔ 1− c > 0,
wb0 < w
l
0 ⇔ 0 < c2, wb0 < wf0 ⇔ −4c3 + 2c4 + 3c5 − c6 < 0, wl0 > wf0 ⇔ 2− c− c2 > 0,
xb0 > x
l
0 ⇔ 16− 4c− 24c2 + 3c3 + 9c4 > 0, xb0 < xf0 ⇔ −8 + 4c+ 10c2 − 4c3 − 3c4 + c5 < 0,
xb1 > x
l
1 ⇔ 16c2 − 8c3 − 24c4 + 10c5 + 9c6 − 3c7 > 0, xb1 < xf1 ⇔ −4 + c+ 3c2 < 0.
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